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In European studies, ambiguity has been often depicted as a precious political 164 resource to accommodate diverging interests, institutions, and political cultures 165 (Hoffmann 1995) . For the most part, ambiguity has been considered as a 166 'constructive' strategy allowing to bring the unification of Europe forward. Like 167 'the market' was used strategically by the European Commission to create a 168 consensus among political actors who had contrasted interests and understandings 169 regarding the creation of a European Single Market (Jabko 2006) , the ambiguity 170 surrounding the notion of structural reforms can be used strategically by various 171 actors. However, whereas 'the market' could be invoked for legitimising purposes, 172 the notion of structural reforms is more politically polarising from the outset. 173 Furthermore, Jegen and Mérand (2014) argue that ambiguity is not always 174 constructive but it is rather a risky political weapon. By examining the ambiguous 175 framing of both energy policy and defence policy in the EU, two policy fields where 176 geopolitical interests diverge greatly among the EU Member States, they find that 177 ambiguity is efficient in creating agreement within a coalition of actors only if it 178 'can be embedded in what we call an institutional opportunity structure-that is, a 179 formal-legal context that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of 180 ideas' (2014: 2-3). 181
Building on these insights, we seek to find whether the ambiguity surrounding 182 structural reforms has been constructive or, in other words, whether said ambiguity 183 has led to gradual ideational change in a way that allows actors of the European 184 Semester (namely the Commission and the Member States) to adapt the meaning of 185 structural reforms to the changing circumstances, that is to the perceived need for 186 more growth-oriented policies and for tackling rising inequalities.
Methods
188
To start, it is important to stress that we do not seek to assess policy change. This 189 would imply to investigate how the recommendations formulated at EU level are 190 filtered by domestic politics and path dependencies and reach (or not) the stage of 191 implementation. Rather, we are tapping into the literature on ideational change by 192 asking a how the meaning of structural reforms has potentially changed over time. 193 Thus, we do not approach our topic from the perspective of a positivist methodology 194 seeking to identify causality between variables, but we rather rely on comparison 195 across time to shed light on (hegemonic) ideational configurations and the change 196 thereof (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) . 197 Our methodology consists in investigating the meaning of structural reforms 198 from the more general to more specific point of view. We first look at the content 199 behind structural reforms across time and space before the coming of age of the 200 European Semester and confront it to the concept of 'empty signifier'. Then, the 201 bulk of our analysis consists in a content analysis of the various documents 202 produced in the framework of the ES, that is the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), the 203 Alert Mechanism Report (AMR), the Euro Area Recommendations (€ARs), and the 204 country-specific recommendations. We combined a software-assisted qualitative 205 analysis (N-Vivo) of all the documents with a more fine-grained although less 206 systematic analysis of the AGS in order to investigate whether the ideational 'What ''Brussels'' means by structural reforms: empty… 
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207 substance subsumed under the notion of structural reforms exhibits consistency or, 208 on the contrary, ambiguity and change over time. We conducted our analysis in 209 several steps. First, an initial screening of the AGS served to map how causal 210 relationship between structural reforms and other pillars of the EUROPEAN 211 SEMESTER-for instance fiscal consolidation or growth-were articulated in order 212 to understand how and whether the hierarchy of broad objectives changed over time 213 and how structural reforms were located within the economic reasoning. Then, we 214 proceeded inductively to code each paragraph comprising the term 'structural 215 reform(s)' in the AGS, AMR, and €AR to determine which policy objectives-such 216 as competitiveness or social inclusion-were referred to and which specific policy 217 reform in relevant reform areas was attached to it (see appendix). A third step 218 consisted in using the same coding scheme of policy reforms to categorise each and 219 every CSRs 1 every year since 2011 in order to elucidate possible ideational change 220 of the structural reforms agenda over time.
2 Finally, to assess more finely whether 221 the ambiguous meaning of structural reforms could serve to incrementally redefine 222 an alternative agenda, we draw on the distinction established by Hemerijck between 223 social retrenchment and social investment (2014: 152) and coded the identified 224 policy reforms as belonging to one of these socio-economic strategies (see 225 appendix). Furthermore, although less central to our demonstration, we also used a 226 series of 24 semi-structured interviews, which we conducted with key actors within 227 the EU institutions and national administrations.
3 This served to complement our 228 content analysis by exploring the subjective understanding of the meaning of 229 structural reforms among those who are in charge of negotiating or implementing 230 the European Semester's policy agenda.
231 Structural reforms: from Washington to Brussels 232 The origins of structural reforms and international organisations 233 Although the notion of structural reforms had many avatars over time and space, it 234 is clearly rooted in the rise of neoliberalism, an itself very malleable set of ideas 235 rather than a structured ideology (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013) . In the 1960s and 236 1970s, the acceptations of structural reforms in the academic or policy making 237 literature are very diverse. From the 1980s on, though, the notion of structural 238 reforms starts crystallising on a policy programme which has been described as the
1FL01
1 All the CSRs were broken down in sub-recommendations in case they were referring to different 1FL02 reforms. As a rule, it was decided to split the CSRs whenever a new action verb was identified. We left 1FL03 out the considérants.
2FL01
2 It should be noted that, insofar as we already had a clear idea at this stage of what structural reforms 2FL02 were referring to, the fact that the CSRs made no mention of the term 'structural reform(s)' was not 2FL03 deemed problematic for the analysis.
3FL01
3 The interviews were conducted in 2016 with key officials from the European Commission as well as 3FL02 officials in four Member States namely Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the UK. As these countries 3FL03 belong to the socio-economic core of the EU, this helps us to grasp the routine or average functioning of 3FL04 the Semester better than in extreme country cases where conditionality attached to financial assistance 3FL05 programmes made for very asymmetric power relations between the EU and national authorities. Further exploring the formative years where the notion of structural reforms 257 emerged and progressively became an almost self-explanatory policy agenda, it is 258 however possible to detect a core of consistent features referred to by the very 259 institutions which forged the notion. As early as in 1980, the IMF notes that 260 economic performance in many countries is affected by 'structural impediments', 261 among which rigidities in wage-setting systems and protectionist measures (IMF 262 1980). The term 'structural reform' appears explicitly in 1993, as referring to the 263 third pillar of any sound economic policy, besides monetary and fiscal instruments. 264 The report points to the necessary removal of constraints for private enterprises 265 through deregulation, calls for tax reforms and liberalised financial markets, and 266 deplores the lack of progress in increasing the flexibility of labour markets through 267 measures attempting to limit the control on wages or job protection, and to reduce 268 the bargaining power of the trade unions. Finally, the report also recommends 269 increasing labour productivity through improved training and education (IMF 270 1993) . 271 Similarly, the OECD points to the need for economies to improve their ability to 272 undergo 'structural change' by removing the 'plethora of regulations, controls, and 273 other impediments to the unfettered working of market economies' (OECD 1980: 274 11). Later in the 1980s, the notion of structural reforms is portrayed as a solution to 275 reduce unemployment, improve business confidence, and to boost investment. 276 Among the important 'structural problems' faced by many countries are protec-277 tionist policies, rigidities in the labour market, tax distortions, industrial subsidies 278 (state intervention), impediments to competition, and inefficiency in public sectors 279 (OECD 1988 ). 280
Three points should therefore be emphasised here which are relevant for 281 understanding structural reforms in today's EU economic governance. First, the 282 notion of structural reforms conveys the idea that reform should not be about 283 changing only the substance of policies, but they ought to change the very nature of 284 the economic, institutional, and, arguably, political structures in which policy is 318 On the one hand, structural reforms are associated with and shall lead to broader 319 objectives, namely fiscal discipline, on the one hand, and growth-notably through 320 investment-on the other. While, in 2013, the issue of taxation on labour is 321 explicitly mentioned, the reference to labour markets and welfare systems is more 322 vague in 2016. Overall, structural reforms are presented as the key vector to 323 economic and social 'modernisation'. The 'Five President Report' from 2015 is also
The broad term euro crisis is deliberately used to reflect the multifaceted nature of the crisis affecting 4FL02 the EU, starting with the US financial crisis provoking a banking crisis in Europe, followed by a sovereign 4FL03 debt crisis, threatening the Eurozone and eventually an economic recession feeding a broader social and 4FL04 even political crisis. 
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324 interesting because it outlines a more long-term view of the EU's policy agenda. 325 Here, structural reforms are defined as 'reforms geared at modernising economies to 326 achieve more growth and jobs. That means both more efficient labour and product 327 markets and stronger public institutions.' (Five Presidents' Report 2015). The 328 versatile definitions of structural reforms seem to crystalise more or less explicitly 329 on an agenda which, as argued by Lebaron, has stabilised in the past decades on 330 three main areas:
331
The liberalization of goods and services markets (which implies the opening to 332 competition and the partial total privatisation); the flexibilisation of labour 333 markets (which aims at strengthening incentives to work such as change in 334 legislation, minimum wages, working time, etc.); and finally, the decrease of 335 public spending, in particular in the social realm (reduction of the alleged 336 generosity of public pension systems, healthcare, etc.) and of ''fiscal pressure'' 337 on firms and ''generators of wealth''. (Lebaron 2014: 5) .
338 At the same time, the formulations, especially the most recent ones, remain broad 339 and vague enough to include a whole range of-yet to be defined-more specific 340 policy measures. 341 While the call for structural reforms constitutes a ubiquitous mantra, they do not 342 constitute an unquestioned dogma. In fact, the longitudinal approach shows that 343 their increasing salience in economic and political discourse cannot be separated 344 from ongoing debates and assessments about their consequences and efficiency in 345 bringing about economic recovery. As early as in 1989, the importance of the 346 sequencing of structural reforms was already pointed out (Edwards 1989 ). 347 Nowadays, there are signs of dampening enthusiasm for structural reforms within 348 the institutions which had promoted them. Since the start of the Great Recession in 349 2008 especially, the IMF has proved more favourable to demand-side policies and 350 growth stimulus (Ban 2015). For his part, Broome finds that 'rather than promoting 351 ''one-size-fits-all'' structural reforms for borrowers facing different economic 352 challenges, the IMF has shifted ''back to the basics'' with a narrower focus on fiscal 353 consolidation' (Broome 2015: 161) . More recently, the OECD has put the emphasis 354 on the context of weak demand and low inflation in the euro area. Speaking of the 355 impact of structural reforms, the report highlights that 'while the bulk of evidence 356 indicates that positive channels dominate the negative ones in normal times, it may 357 no longer be true when reforms are introduced at an unfavourable stage in the 358 business cycle' (OECD 2016: 68). The report adds that reforms aimed at reducing 359 the cost of labour, raising incentives to take-up work, and enhancing competition in 360 product markets may have contractionary effects on demand during downturns. 
370
In sum, the preliminary historical exploration of the ideational substance of 371 structural reforms shows that they can hardly be conceived as an empty signifier in 372 the Laclauian sense; that is, detached from any particular signified. Rather, we 373 identify an ideational core rooted in the tenets of neoliberalism about what to do 374 about public spending (including public administrations), labour markets (dereg-375 ulation), and product and services markets (liberalisation). Furthermore, as 376 structural reforms have tended to become a synonym for modernisation, it has 377 served to describe a fundamentally ambiguous policy agenda. Against the 378 background of the euro crisis, we observe the continuous tension between fiscal 379 consolidation and growth, demand-side and supply-side policies, between austerity 380 and investment. This is notably due to the intrinsically contestable nature of the 381 knowledge as accounted for by the disagreements between the EU and the 382 international institutions (IMF and OECD). Thus, by incorporating such potentially 383 incompatible policies, the notion of structural reforms reflect a process of political 384 bricolage resulting in ambiguity which serves to mask the pursuit of a hegemonic 385 agenda, as pointed at by critical scholars.
386 The European Semester: a new policy agenda emerging?
387 The hard core and fuzzy contours of structural reforms 388 The content analysis of the main documents produced by the EU institutions in the 389 framework of the ES provides evidence that the ambiguities as to the nature and 390 purpose of structural reforms have allowed a progressive redefinition of priorities in 391 the EU's agenda. A first inductive analysis of the EU's broad economic priorities as 392 they appear in the AGS (2011-2016) allows to distinguish between three periods. In 393 2011, fiscal consolidation was clearly the top priority, with structural reforms and 394 'growth enhancing measures' as second and third objectives. From 2012 to 2014, 395 the objectives remained very stable: while 'growth-friendly fiscal consolidation' 396 still ranked first, it was accompanied by a broader set of objectives, namely 397 'restoring normal lending to the economy', 'promoting growth and competitive-398 ness', 'tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis', and 399 'modernising public administration'. Finally, in 2015 and 2016, the AGS refocused 400 on only three objectives with investment emerging as the top priority, structural 401 reforms remaining central, and 'fiscal responsibility' coming only third. A second 402 observation is that the AGS does not offer a consistent understanding of the role of 403 structural reforms in the broader economic agenda, thus making the underlying 404 economic reasoning obscure. 
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410 facilitated by fiscal consolidation. This is confirmed by the way in which the EU 411 Commission itself has theorised the circular interaction between fiscal consolida-412 tion, structural reforms, and investment. As Fig. 1 ' . 5 Yet, the Semester, the EU Commission seemed to admit the existence of a 420 trade-off by granting a number of Member States (including France and Italy) more 421 flexibility regarding deficit rules in exchange of the commitment to engage with 422 structural reforms as early as 2013 and again in 2015. 423 To get a sense of the subjective understanding of structural reforms, we explored 424 how key officials in charge of the formulations of the AGS and formulations of the 425 CSRs, or in their implementation at the national level, subjectively understood the 426 notion of structural reforms (Table 2 ). We were struck by their frequent immediate 
427 reaction of surprise which translated either in laughs or obvious embarrassment. 428 Most interviewees expressed deep uncertainty or even irony when faced with the 429 question, before making a conscious decision about whether they were going to give 430 a politically correct or incorrect answer. 431 Without pretending to any representativeness, Table 2 illustrates some of the 432 most typical answers we received and highlight three sets of recurring elements. 433 First, structural reforms should have positive long-term effects leading to economic In order to tease out the substantive meaning of structural reforms further, we 440 looked at which specific policy reforms in various areas were attached to structural 441 reforms in all EU-wide documents (see Fig. 2 ). This leads us to a number of 442 interesting observations. First, structural reforms are pursuing a fairly wide range of 443 six broad reform objectives-ranging from competitiveness to social inclusion-444 which reflects the intrinsic ambiguity of the notion. Second, a significant share of 445 our references does not specify the kind of policy recipes attached to broader 446 objectives and structural reforms, which is consistent with the idea that structural 447 reforms is to some extent a self-explanatory empty signifier. Third, labour market 448 reforms and the liberalisation and deregulation of products and services markets 449 stand for the bulk of reform areas for nearly all of these objectives. The remaining 450 objective, namely fiscal consolidation, is more strongly associated with reforms in 451 the area of pensions and healthcare. 452
Our first set of data thus gives a complex picture, which reflects the ambiguous 453 nature of structural reforms which are associated with numerous, often vaguely 454 defined, and potentially conflicting policy objectives and solutions. Typical policy 455 solutions inherited from the 'Washington consensus' is consistently central, 456 especially labour market reforms. Furthermore, when investment is invoked as an 
478 investment, or, on the contrary, under a social retrenchment regime (see appendix). 6 479 The objective was to assess whether it was possible to detect a shift in the agenda 480 promoted through the ES for understanding macro-economic developments. The 481 emergence of the social investment perspective dates back to the second half of the 482 1990s, when leading experts advocated the departure both from the post-war 483 insurance welfare state and from the excessive emphasis on retrenchment of the 484 1980s. Central to this perspective is the argument that the State must 'prepare' 485 individuals to adapt to new social risks over their life course, instead of simply 486 'repairing' damage through passive cash benefits. Therefore, the breaking point we 487 used to distinguish between the strategies of social investment and social 488 retrenchment relates to how they, respectively, considered social policy. While 489 the former considers social policy as a 'productive factor', the latter sees it 490 essentially through the prism of cost-containment. 491 Figure 4 shows that social investment is a perspective that is present in the 492 European Semester from the outset. The first three cycles of the European Semester 493 saw a gradual increase in the salience of this theme, which partly reflects the overall 494 booming growth of the number of CSRs between 2011 (107) and 2014 (223). 495 Following the streamlining efforts of the European Semester under the Juncker 496 Commission, the balance between the two strategies restored in 2015. Since then, 497 the proportion of CSRs related to social investment has kept a rising trend, with 498 approximately two-thirds of the CSRs in 2016 and more than three quarters in 2017. 499 However, it seems premature to conclude on this basis that the ES has moved 500 towards a more social-friendly agenda, for two reasons. 501
The first is that the proportion of CSRs falling under one or the other strategy is 502 only an imperfect measure of ideational change in the European Semester. In fact, 503 the potential number of recommendations that can be related to social retrenchment 504 seems more limited than is the case for social investment, which could explain why 505 the latter showed a more important increase over time. Moreover, the more 506 governments embrace reforms rooted in social retrenchment, the less likely they are 507 to receive recommendations on that area in the following years, leading almost 508 mechanically to a greater salience of social investment solutions. 509
The second reason is that not all CSRs have the same legal and political 510 importance. Although social investment is more represented in the CSRs in 511 proportion to social retrenchment, it remains that the latter often relies on more solid 512 legal foundations. To put it differently, when asked to implement the CSRs, 513 Member States are faced on the one hand with few but strong recommendations to 514 curb spending or reduce labour costs, and on the other hand, with more numerous 515 but softer requests to engage in social investment. In the end, we can only raise here 516 the logical consequences of ambiguity at the stage of formulation when considering 517 implementation. Given the pressure for fiscal discipline, the amount of investment 518 advocated leaves the Member States in the face of inescapable trade-offs. 6FL01 6 We differ from Hemerijk in that we only focus on recommendations pertaining directly to the welfare 6FL02 state, thus leaving aside reforms related to finance, taxation, the single market, and energy. 
519 Discussion and conclusions 520 One year after it took office, the EU Commission under the Presidency of Juncker 521 communicated its ambition to 'revamp' the European Semester. From the point of 522 view of public communication, this term seems somewhat awkward since it 523 suggests that things would change only at the surface whereas expectations for 524 tackling the weak output legitimacy of the EU's macro-economic governance were 525 strong. The objective of this paper has been to assess which policy content is hiding 526 behind the notion of structural reforms, a key pillar of the EU's economic 527 governance, and to what extent it has reflected a change in the agenda promoted at 528 EU level. The longitudinal exploration of the origins of structural reforms until the 529 euro crisis shows that it is not an 'empty signifier' in the Laclauian sense since a 530 core of policy ideas can be identified across time and space. At the same time, the 531 contours of the notion remain fuzzy, allowing for ambiguity and the incorporation 532 of contrasted ideational components. 533 Behind a discursive turn towards growth and investment around 2014, we have 534 observed that the hierarchy and relationship between structural reforms and other 535 key objectives of EU governance (such as investment or fiscal consolidation) remain 536 vague and circular. Interviews show that key officials involved can refer to an 537 official definition of structural reforms while often contesting its analytical 538 relevance and/or its political legitimacy. The same policy solutions-most 539 prominently labour market reforms associated with the liberalisation of products 540 and services markets, and the reforms of public administration-are consistently 
541 invoked as conducive of several potentially conflicting objectives ranging from 542 competitiveness and fiscal consolidation to investment and social inclusion. Finally, 543 the policy content attached to structural reforms in the European Semester displays 544 a fundamental ambiguity as to whether said reforms are pursuing simultaneously 545 social retrenchment or social investment. 546 In many ways, our findings speak to the literature about the translation of 547 neoliberalism across time and space. First, one may argue that the type of 548 incremental change we describe constitutes a case of translation (over time) implied 549 by collective learning and 'displacing already existing discursive arrangements as a 550 result of their effects of policy conceptions, political economic agendas and political 551 strategies' (Kjaer and Pedersen 2001: 241-242). Second, this process could also be 552 seen as an instance of translation across space engendering a new transnational 553 neoliberal 'hybrid' at EU level, which can then be further translated into more 554 radical or more moderate neoliberal hybrids depending on the timing of reforms and 555 nature of the involved agency in specific domestic realms (Ban 2016). 556
However, we believe that our approach and findings suggest a different 557 interpretation which echoes the debates among experts and scholars as to whether 558 the various objectives of the Semester are not contradicting each other. Many have 559 raised doubts that austerity and growth-friendly policies such as investment can be 560 pursued at the same time or, in other words, whether such a thing as 'expansionary 561 consolidation' (Blyth 2014) can lead Europe out of stagnation. The low degree of 562 ideational change over time allowed only by the ambiguity and fuzziness of the 563 meaning of structural reforms points to a strategic adaptation to discontent with 564 austerity. This has resulted in the absorption of policy components related to a 565 growth-oriented agenda and social investment into an older neoliberal agenda-566 centred on fiscal discipline combined with market liberalisation and deregulation-567 which has remained fairly consistent over time. 568
This may be the result of two intertwined process. From a (first) ontological 569 perspective, knowledge is intrinsically subjective and contestable (Best 2008 (Best , 2012 . 570 This has been reflected in the ongoing controversy among experts over the expected 571 consequences of structural reforms and the increasingly critical assessment of the 572 EU's socio-economic agenda by the IMF and the OECD. From a (second) strategic 573 perspective, ambiguous ideas such as structural reforms serve to absorb a range of 574 contrasted ideational components, thus reinforcing hegemony (Laclau 2006) . 575 Insofar, incremental ideational change reflects power struggles over meaning. The 576 increasing ambiguity pertaining to the broad objectives and the specific policies 577 promoted through the European Semester has served to diffuse emerging conflict 578 and neutralise those who-ranging from the radical left and the unions to a section 579 of the Social Democrats-have contested the efficiency and legitimacy of the 580 European Semester and its agenda. This is consistent with the recent research on 581 how changes in the functioning of the ES have resulted from the activism of more 582 socially minded actors, with limited results in terms of ideas and policies (Copeland 583 forthcoming). Whether such strategic adaptation through incremental ideational 584 change should be considered as constructive ambiguity remains open to interpre-585 tation. Arguably, it rather points to a consolidation of the prevailing, hegemonic 
